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Toxicological and Structural Consequences from Sodium-Water Reaction in Cell
Containing the Secondary Sodium Tank
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
The analysis will show the consequences should the solid sodium in the Secondary
Sodium Tank react with a presumed layer of water in the cell. The Peer Review Checklist is
attached.
1.2 PHYSICAL DATA
Tank T-44 is the Secondary Sodium Tank. The tank is 12 ft in diameter. The body of the
tank is 31 ft, 8 inches long (31.67 ft). There is an ellipsoidal head on both ends. The total length
with the heads is 38 ft, 7.625 in. The head and shell thicknesses are 1.125 inches each. (Data
from Drawing H-4-11713).
Tank T-44 is in a cell. The base of the cell is at £1. 503 ft, 0 inches. The cell is 24 ft tall,
43 ft long and 20 ft wide (data per drawing H-4-14416). (See Figure 1) The only openings are
in the top of the cell.
1.3 ASSUMPTIONS
1. 30 gallons of sodium are in Tank T-44 (email from Tom Burke to R. Marusich-
Attachment 1). The sodium is solid. It is assumed to be evenly distributed over the
bottom of Tank T-44.
2. Sodium fills the base of the tank from one end of the barrel to the other. To simplify, the
determination of sodium thickness, it is assumed that there is no sodium in the ellipsoidal
heads.
3. Pool of water exists on the floor of the cell containing Tank T-44. The depth of the pool
is slightly greater than the peak thickness of the solid sodium volume in the tank.
4. Tank T-44 immediately and catastrophically fails such that all ofthe sodium in the tank
enters the water at the same time.
5. Since the sodium density is less than that for water, sodium floats in water. Therefore,
the top surface of the solid chunk of sodium does not react with water.
6. The reaction rate, as a function of the area (units of g/s-cm2) of solid sodium in the water,
for a large chunk of solid sodium is the same as that taken from small samples.
I
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7. All hydrogen from the sodium-water reaction immediately reacts with air on the surface
of the sodium due to the heat of the reaction (i.e., hydrogen auto-ignites and "bums" in
air).
8. Expansion ofthe cell air due to the heat ofthe sodium-water reaction transports the
suspended sodium hydroxide out of the cell.
9. The distance to the offsite person is 4.5 miles per FFTF Safety Analysis Report.
2.0 REACTION OF SODIUM AND WATER
Per e-mail from Tom Burke to R. Marusich (Attachment I), 30 gallons of sodium are in
the tank. It is assumed that the tank "disappears" instantly (a long crack opens in the base of the
tank) and 30 gallons of solid sodium enters a presumed pool of water on the floor of the cell such
that all ofthe sodium reacts.
2.1 REACTION EQUATION
The reaction is
Na + HzO --t NaOH + 0.5 Hz.
Hydrogen tends to bum immediately in the pressure of air. The sodium hydroxide
dissolves in the water.
It is assumed that all of the hydrogen immediately reacts with air as it is generated.
Therefore the reaction is
Na + HzO --t NaOH + 0.5 Hz
0.5 H2 + 0.25 O2 --t 0.5 H20
or
Na + 0.5 H20 + 0.25 02 --t NaOH.
2.2 REACTION HEAT AND RESULTS OF AN INSTANTEOUS REACTION
(I)
(2)
The heat of reaction is found by subtracting the heat of formation of the reactants from
that of the products.
The heats of formation are:
H2
Na
o
o
2
O2
H20 (liquid)
NaOH
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o
-68.3 kcal/mole
-101.96 if NaOH remains a solid
-112.2 if NaOH goes into solution at I part per 400 parts water.
Assume NaOH goes into solution as this is most likely the case and, also, is a worst case
condition. Then the heat of reaction using, Equation 2, is:
Hre.clion = -112.2 - [(-68.3)(0.5) + 1(0) + 0.25(0)]
= 78 kcal/mo1e Na
=327 kJ/mole Na
There are 30 gallons of sodium or 0.114 m3• The density of solid sodium is 968 kg/m3.
There is 110 kg or 4783 moles (using 23 g/mole).
The heat liberated by the reaction is
H =(327 kJ/mole)(4783 moles)
= 1.56 x 106 kJ or 1.56 x 109 J.
The volume of the cell is determined next. Since the sodium tank has an opening that
runs the full length ofthe tank and is 2 ft wide (see Section 2.1), the void volume within the tank
is counted in the volume ofthe cell. The volume of water on the floor is negligible as compared
to the over-all cell volume. The tank volume is
v = (24 ft)(20 ft)(43 ft)
=20,640 fe
=5.84 x 105 L.
At 298 K and 1 atm (initial conditions), there is 23,900 moles of air (using the ideal gas
law with the gas constant of 0.082 L-atmlmole-K) in 5.84 x 105 L.
Air is mainly composed of79% nitrogen and 21 % oxygen. Therefore, of the 23,900
moles of air in the cell, there are 18,880 moles of nitrogen and 5020 moles of oxygen. After the
reaction there are fewer moles of oxygen. One mole of sodium reacts with 0.25 moles of
oxygen. There are 4783 moles of sodium. So, after the reaction there are 1196 fewer moles of
oxygen. At the completion of the reaction, the total moles in the atmosphere in the cell are
18,880 moles of nitrogen and 3820 moles of oxygen for a total of 22,700 moles. Cell
pressurization is due to expansion of the air due to heating.
The average specific heat of nitrogen and oxygen between 300 K and 3000 K is
1.18 J/g-K and 1.08 JIg-I<, respectively (Data from www.engineeringtoolbox.com). Ignore the
water vapor that may go into the air by the heat of the reaction and assume all heat goes to the
air. The temperature increase is found by the equation below. The heat absorbed by the water
and that absorbed by the walls is ignored for conservatism and due to the speed of the reaction
(see Section 2.1). The equation is:
3
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Q=mCyLlT
Where Q = heat added, kJ
=1.56 x 109 J
m = mass in atmosphere, moles
= 18,880 moles of nitrogen
= 3820 moles of oxygen
R = ideal gas law constant
= 8.314 J/mo1e-K
Cp= specific heat of nitrogen at constant pressure
= (1.18 kJ/kg-k)(28 g/mo1e)
= 33 J/mole-K
Cy = specific heat of nitrogen at constant volume, J/mole-K
=Cp-R
= 24.7 J/mole-K
Cp= specific heat of oxygen at constant pressure
= (1.08 kJ/kg-k)(32 g/mole)
= 34.6 J/mole-K
Cy= specific heat of oxygen at constant volume, J/mole-K
=Cp-R
= 26.3 J/mole-K
LlT = temperature rise, K.
Using the end point moles of nitrogen and oxygen (18,880 moles of nitrogen and
3820 moles of oxygen) and solving, yields a value for LlT of 2750 K. The final temperature is
3050 K.
The final pressure, using the ideal gas law with 3050 K, 18,880 moles of nitrogen and
3820 moles of oxygen is 9.7 atm or 143 psia or 128 psig.
3.0 TIME VARYING REACTION
3.1 REACTION RATE
The sodium-water reaction is not instantaneous, however. Page 12 of Modeling and
Control Scoping Study for the ANL-WEST Sodium Facility Reaction Vessel states that a 1 cm3
cube (weighs about I gram) of sodium took 10 seconds to fully dissolve in a beaker of water at
room temperature.
The density of sodium is 968 kg/m3 or 0.968 g/cm3. A I cm3 piece weighs 0.968 g. The
area of one of the sides is 1 cm2• Assuming the cube floats such that 5 of the 6 sides contact
water, the reaction rate is
4
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0.968 g (_1_, ) =0.019 g Is _ cm' which is rounded up to 0.02 g Icm' - s
lOs 5cm
Sodium fills the bottom of the tank. There are 30 gallons of sodium or 0.114 m3. The
tank is 31.67 ft long with ellipsoidal heads. It is assumed that there is no sodium in the
ellipsoidal heads to determine the height of solid sodium in the tank, the area of a circular
segment must be determined.
The area of a circular segment (see Figure 2) is taken from standard handbook
geometrical equations for areas of portions of a circle. The area is:
r'A=-(B-sinB)
2
Where, in this case r = 6 ft or 72 in.
The volume of sodium is 0.114 m3 or 4 fe. The length of the solid sodium is 31.67 ft (or
9.7 m). The area is 0.126 ft' or 18.2 in2.
Solving for eyields 0.349 radians.
The value of (r-h) is
Solving for (r-h) yields 70.91 in. This makes "h" 1.09 inches (as r is 72 inches).
The flat surface of the circular segment is
2r (sin ~)= 25 inches
The arc length given by:
A I h 7Z"(12 ft)(0.349 radians)rc engt = 2.09 it(27Z"' radians)
=25 in.
The section entitled Mensuration Formulas of the Chemical Engineers Handbook
provides two equations for the area of a circular segment. They are
5
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2
A = !.- (8 - sin 8)
2
and
where the terms are as described above using the second equation with A = 18.2 in' and r = 72
in., the value of H is found to be 1.09 in.
Using H = 1.09 in. and r = 72 in., (r-h) is 70.9 in. From Figure 1
!... = ~' - (r-h)' f' = 12.48 in.
2
The length (2 * £12) is 25 in.
The angle eis found to be
8 r-h
a cos-=--
2 r
8 = 20° or 0.349 radius
Assume the entire piece enters the water at the same time. Sodium is less dense than is
water therefore it floats on the surface but almost submerged. As a result, only the bottom
portion will assumed to react. The reaction area is the arc length times length
Reaction area = [(25 in.)(2.54 cm/in)][(9.7 m)(lOO cm/m»)
= 6.16 x 104 cm'
It is assumed that the reaction rate found above for small pieces of solid sodium can be
applied to large pieces as well. The reaction rate is
Reaction Rate = (0.02 ~ )6.16 x 104 em')
s-cm J
= 1232 g,Na/s.
Since there are 110 kg of sodium, the duration of the reaction is:
6
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d .(1._IO_k-=g:..:.)(.:....1O_0_0-"g_l---'kg:..:.)uratlOn =-
1232 gls
= 90 s (rounded up).
3.2 TOXICOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
There are 4 different openings in the ceiling of the cell (see Attachment 2). The
ventilation duct penetrates the ceiling in the SW corner of the cell. A pipe chase penetrates the
ceiling in the SE corner. Electrical conduit penetrate the ceiling near the center of the cell. An
opening exists in the ceiling toward the north end to allow manned entry into the cell. There is a
hatch cover over this opening. The pipe chase and electrical conduit are sealed, in that one can
not look into the cell, however these seals are not air tight and could be blown out.
For purposes of this analysis it is assumed that all of the generated NaOH is suspended in
the atmosphere of the cell and is transported out of the cell due to expansion of the cell
atmosphere caused by the heat generated by the reaction.
The generation rate of sodium hydroxide is found from the chemical reaction in which
I mole of sodium reacted to form I mole of sodium hydroxide.
The generation rate of sodium hydroxide is
"0 (1232 g ,Nals II mole NaOH)JVa H rate =
23 g, Nalmole I mole Na
= 53.6 moles, NaOH I s or 2143 g, NaOH Is.
The sodium hydroxide release from the cell is due to heating of the air causing buoyancy
and expansion (like a fire). The energy release rate comes from the reaction rate. Using the
reaction where hydrogen burns as it is created.
H = 327 kllmole
Then
dQ = (327 kJ y1232 g,Na ymale)
dt mole A s A23 g
=1.75 X 107 lIs
=18 Mw (rounded up)
There are two cases to be considered for toxicological release. The first is the
unmitigated case. In this case the heat from the reaction causes the air in the cell to expand. The
expanding air carries the NaOH particles out of the cell into the atmosphere where wind carries it
7
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downwind. The other case is where the building above the cell exists. The expanding air carries
sodium into the building. It can still be transported out of the facility but not as an expanding
plume. In this case the release is an area source as the release will travel through a number of
external exits to the building, to the atmosphere and then carried downwind as a non-buoyant
plume.
The first case considered will be the unmitigated case. The downwind concentration of
sodium hydroxide is given by
C = (G)(XlQ)
Where G =release rate of sodium hydroxide, mgls
= 2.2 x 106 mgls (2200 gls)
XlQ = measure of atmosphere dispersion, s/m3 (see below)
C = concentration, mglm3
The XlQ is obtained from a RADIDOSE spreadsheet (see Attachment 3). RADIDOSE is
a DOE-approved method for determining consequences (HNF-26181). Numerical values are
needed for the following input cells to obtain XlQ:
• heat release flag = 4 (Cell H19),
• heat release (Mw), (Cell H20),
• diameter of heat release area, m, (Cell H21),
• distance to offsite person =(Cell H18),
• distance to onsite person = (Cell 16)
• Hanford Area of interest = 4 (Cell HIS), and
• All other cells remain at their default value.
In this case
Cell H16 = 100 m, a typical safety analysis value,
Cell H18 = 7243 m based on a distance of 4.5 miles per the FFTF Safety Analysis
Report,
Cell H20 = 18 (units are Mw),
Cell H21 =10 m (see below).
The diameter is taken to be the diameter of a circle whose area equals that of the cell as
the larger the diameter, the greater the XlQ. The cell is 43 ft by 20 ft. The equivalent diameter is
33 ft or 10 m. So the input to Cell H21 is 10 meters.
The XlQ is found to be (See Attachment 3).
• 6.9 X 10.5 onsite (Cell G39), and
• 2.6 x 10.6 offsite (Cell 139).
Using these values, the sodium hydroxide concentration is
8
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• 152 mg/m3 onsite, and
• 6 mg/m3 offsite.
The limits for toxicological releases are given in terms of ERPG. For sodium hydroxide
ERPG-I = 0.5 mg/m3
ERPG-2 =5 mg/m3
ERPG-3 = 50 mg/m3
The onsite concentration exceeds ERPG-3. The offsite concentration is ERPG-2.
Consider a case where there is some heat transfer to the walls, ceiling and equipment.
This assumption is made to see how cooling affects the toxicological release. A lower heat rate
results in a lower plume height and greater concentration of sodium hydroxide. For purposes of
illustration, assume the cooling is such that the effective heat rate is 4 Mw not 18 Mw. This
corresponds to the walls, ceiling and equipment absorbing 75% of the generated heat. Now X/Q
is (See Attachment 2)
• 2.8 X 10-4 onsite, and
• 8.7 x 10-6 offsite.
The concentration is
616 mg/m3 onsite (exceeds ERPG-3), and
19 mg/m3 offsite (exceeds ERPG-2).
Even at a lesser heat rate, the effect (in terms of which ERPG is exceeded) remains the
same.
Thus for the case of a unmitigated release,
• the onsite concentration (at 100 m) exceeds ERPG-3, and
• the offsite concentration exceeds ERPG-2 but not ERPG-3.
The concentrations from both of these calculations are "HIGH Consequences" per Table
2-3 of HNF-8739, Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH), Rev. 1.
As a result there is no need to look at the case of a release into the building. Those results cannot
be any worse (in terms of categorization).
3.3 PRESSURIZATION
Section 1.4 shows that the cell pressurization is due to expansion of the air due to heating.
The final air temperature, shown in Section 1.4 is 3050 K. At I atm, and 22,700 moles (endpoint
conditions after some oxygen is used in the reaction with sodium), the volume needed to
accommodate these conditions is
9
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v = nRT
P
(22,700 moles)(0.082 L-atmlmole-K)(3050 K)
=
I atm
= 5.68 X 106 L
The initial volume is 5.84 x 105 L.
Section 2.1 shows that the reaction is over in 90 seconds. The average air flow rate that
has to be accommodated to prevent any pressurization is
5.68 X 10
6
L - 5.84 X 105 L =56,600 LIs or 2000 ft3/s
90s
The hatch in the NW part of the cell is 8 ft by 4 ft (scaling off drawing H-4-13 I 19). The
area is 32 ft2.
Now to find the pressure drop that corresponds to a flow rate of 56,600 Us out of a 32 ft2
opening. The Crane Technical Paper 410, Flow ofFluids through Valves, Fittings and Pipe
gives equations for compressible flow.
q =6.87 y d~ C (Mp, )05
Sg
Where Y = expansion factor
= I for small values of ~P per pg. A-21 of the reference
do = diameter of opening, in.
=64 in. [from hydraulic diameter =4 (Area)/(perimeter))
C =flow coefficient
= 1.0 for a nozzle having a small dnozzlJddownstream volume ratio (see top figure on pg. A-20
of the reference)
Sg = specific gravity of gas relative to air
= 1.0
pu =upstream density of air, Ib/ft3
= 0.04lb/ft3 (See below)
q = flow rate, feIs
= 2000 ft3/s (from 56,600 Us)
~p = pressure drop, psi
The density of air at the start of the event is
d . (18,800 moles N 2 *28glmole)+(5020moles 0, *32glmole) 118 ILenslty at start = 5 =. g
5.84xlO L
10
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At the end of the reaction, the density of the atmosphere is
d · d (18,800 moles N z *28glmole)+(3820moles 02 *32glmole) 0 ILenslty at en = 6 = .117g
5.55x10 L
An average upstream value of 0.65 gIL or 0.04 Ib/fe will be used in the analysis.
Solving for D.P yields 0.13 psig.
The pressure difference between the cell holding Tank T-44 and the area into which the
air flows is small. This means that the area into which the air flows is also pressurizing. This
area is the cell above the cell containing Tank T-44.
Now consider the conditions in the cell holding Tank T-44 and in the cell above. The cell
above is 22 ft wide, 56 ft long (to the wall south ofY-9 and Y-12) and 17.75 ft tall (assuming
that the ceiling is 2 ft thick (scaled off of the drawing). The volume is 6.2 x 105 L. The volume
is about the same as the cell holding Tank T-44.
The number of moles in the cell above is 25,400 at I atm and 298 K. Assume no cooling
and complete mixing such that the temperature rise in both rooms is half that in the cell holding
Tank T-44 or one-half of 2750 K or 1375 K. The final temperature in both cells is 1673 K. The
total moles in both rooms is
Total moles =18,880 + 3820 + 25,400 =48,100 moles.
Using the ideal gas law with 48,100 moles, 1673 K and 1.2 x 106 L, yields a final
pressure of 5.5 atm or 66 psig.
The effects of the pressure increase are as follows:
• The ventilation duct will likely be blown out at some location. If the duct can withstand
the forces due to the flow resulting from a pressure of 65 psig, the filters will be blown
out.
• The North wall (wall between equipment E-604 and Y-9 and Y-12) does not appear to be
a substantial wall and as a result will likely fail.
• The hatch cover and the packing in the electrical and piping penetration between the cell
holding Tank T-44 and the cell above will blowout. Drawing H-4-13 123 shows what
appears to be a concrete block wall in the East wall of the cell above that which holds
Tank T-44. If this is the case, the block will be blown out.
• The cell adjoining the one above that holding Tank T-44 will be pressurized and
experience similar structural failures as those listed above, if the wall is concrete block.
This effect could cascade into other cells depending on the details of construction, the
large flow paths to other cells (e.g., stairways) and speed of cooling.
II
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ATTACHMENT 1- EMAIL FROM TM BURKE TO RM MARUSICH
From: Burke, Thomas M (Tom)
sent: Friday, February 29,20083:43 PM
To: Marusich, Robert M
SUbject: Analysis of Sodium-Water Reaction and Hydrogen "Burn"
Bob,
I participated in a Hazard Analysis Table Top this afternoon in support of FFTF preparing to go
into a long term S&M condition. Other participants were Bill Dautel, John Dale, Dave Polzin, Ed
Dodd, Bernie Nowack, and Jeff Marusich. One of the "events" we decided to have analyzed is
a sodium water-reaction in the cell containing our secondary sodium storage tank which has an
estimated 30 gallons of residual sodium remaining in it. It was suggested that you would be the
best person to do the analysis. Here is the scenario:
- A large quantity of water accumulates in the cell containing the tank
- The tank essentially "disappears" by some unspecified mechanism (corrosion over a long
period of time?)
- The 30 gallons of sodium react completely with the water (Na + H20 => NaOH + 1/2H2 +
Heat)
- All of the hydrogen generated is retained in the cell and mixes with the air in the cell (free
volume of 13,100 ft3 per HEDL-TME 75-122). I assume the mixture will be above the LFL.
- II ignites. All of the energy from the hydrogen burn as well as the original sodium-water
reaction raise the pressure in the cell (assume no leakage even though there certainly will be).
What is the pressure? Is it really a detonation and treated differently than just raising the
pressure?
I tried to quickly find the "design" or allowable pressure for the cell but couldn't. Maybe Bill or
Dave can do that next week. I guess they'll also have to provide you with a charge code.
If you have any questions, contact me, Bill or Dave.
Thanks,
Project Manager
FFTF Sodium Disposition
376-2207 (400 Area)
438-3212 (Cell)
15
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ATTACHMENT 2 - MEMO FROM POLZIN TO MARUSICH
From: Polzin, David L (Dave)
sent: Thursday, March 27, 2008 4:23 PM
To: Marusich, Robert M
Cc: Dautel, William A; Burke, Thomas M (Tom)
SUbject: RE: Additional Data needs - Analysis of Sodium-Water Reaction and Hydrogen "Burn"
Bob,
There are 4 different openings in the floor of cell 431 that connect to cell 401 below. The H&V ducts go
through an opening in the southwest corner, some piping goes through an opening in the southeast
corner, some electrical conduit goes through an opening along the east wall (near the center of the room),
and there is an opening toward the north end along the east wall for manned entry into cell 401. Most of
these openings are closed off to some extent with grating, diamond plate, or piping/ducting/conduit
passing through. If the hatch cover is open above the entry ladder into cell 401, you can look down and
see the tank, piping, etc. I would also note that cell 401 communicates with a couple of pipe ways
through openings in the walls. These are shown on drawing H-4-13123 and H-4-13689. Cell 401 is
definitely not an air-tight cell.
Dave
16
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Marusich. Robert M
To:
Subject:
Marusich. Robert M
RE: OUO Determination for Toxicological and Structural- Hydrogen From The Secondary
Sodium Tank
Message forwarded from W. Daute\. FFTF concerning the DUO status of the paper,
-----Original Message-----
From: Witherspoon, Wiley V III
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2008 3:0S PM
TO: Niebel, Sheryl A (Sheri)
Subject: RE: Coveer sheet - Toxicological and Structural - Hydrogen From The Secondary.doc
I think it is a stretch to get to DUO # 2. The closest I can get is "Can the information be used to gain access
to key component of the facility to disrupt operations or harm employees?" This does not tell how to gain
access, but it does give parameters used in the equation that could be used to disrupt or harm if someone
could interpret and then invoke, I say no to DUO at this time. Wiley
Wiley Witherspoon PMP, CM
Program Office Manager
FFTF Fuel Offload and Asset Management
509-376-1805
509-376-4920 fax
wiley_vjitwitherspoon@rl.gov
-----Original Message·..·-
From: Dautel. William A
Sent: Monday, June 09. 2008 4: 12 PM
To: Burke, Thomas M (Tom); Niebel, Sheryl A (Sheri)
Subject: FW: Coveer sheet - Toxicological and Structural - Hydrogen From The Secondary.doc
Tom& Sheri,
It looks okay to me, I know of no reason that this would have to be DUO.
Bill Dautel
373-9563
-----Original Message-----
From: Marusich, Robert M
Sent: Monday, June 09, 2006 3:56 PM
To: Dautel, William A
Subject: Coveer sheet - Toxicological and Structural - Hydrogen From The Secondary.doc
Bill,
17
HNF-37988 Rev. 0
ATTACHMENT 3 - XlQ FOR THE TOXICOLOGICAL RELEASE
XlQ for the toxicological release for the FFTF sodium-water and hydrogen-air reaction which
creates sodium hydroxide.
Case I:
Q= 18 Mw
Effective pool diameter = 10 m
E I F I G I H I I J I K I L
I RADIDOSE Version 3.0 (5-18-2005)
2 Input Parameter User Input Default Description (based on user input)
2- FacilitylMaterial (1-14): I Plutonium Finishing Plant: < 10% Pu·240
~ FOOD of Material (1-10); 7 Pu Oxide and Other Powders5 Accident Type (1-6): I Fire
~ Quantity at Risk (MAR): I gram
r1- Damage Ratio: I
,.!. Airborne Release Fraction: 6.ooE-03 ARF from SARAH Table 3-4 (ARF page)
9 Respirable Fraction: 0.1 RF from SARAH Table 3-4 (ARF page)
"to Leak Path Factor: 1 LPF (applies to particulate only)ru HEPA Filter Factor: 1 DF = 1 (applies to particulate only)
i-# Collocated Worker Dose Factor: 3 ICRP 68. 5 ~m AMAD~ Onsite & Offsite Public Dose Factor: 7 ICRP 72 for Adult14 Material Solubility Class: 3 compounds are generally insoluble
~ Hanford Processing Area (1-4): 4 400 Area~ Distance or XlQ for Collocated Worker: 100 meters~ Distance or XlQ for Onsite Public: 4.210 meters18 Distance or XlQ for Offsite Public: 7240 meters
~ Emission Source Type (1-4): 4 Ground level fire~ Thermal Power (2 to 1000 MW): 18 MW (at 0.23 WIJTil)~ Pool Fire Diameter (l to 20 m): 10 meters (Area = 78.5 m1)22
23 Description of Accident Scenario: Edit using function key F2. Carriage returns are not allowed.
~~26 Offiste XlQ based on distance from FFfF to the Site Boundary which is 4.5 miles.
'27
'28~
30 Dose Results for the Postulated Accident: I
31 Plutonium Finisbin2 Plant: <10% Pu~240 ~~ New comDOsition (2004) Material source amounts are
32 Pu Oxide and Otber Powders listed on the "UnitDF" Daile.
33 Ground Level Fire ~~ 18 MW ~~ 10.0 m Diameter 400 Area
34 Total Respirable Release: 6.00E-04 gram
35 Dose Factors: ICRP68,5um ICRP 72 for Adult Release
36 Collocated Onsite Offsite Duration
37 ReceDtor: Worker Public Public Ih
38 Distance: 100m 4,21Om 7.240m
39 XlO: 6.88E-05 2.74E-06 2.59E-06 s1m3
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Case 2:
Q=4Mw
Effective pool diameter = 10 ill
HNF-37988 Rev. 0
E I F I G I H I I I J I K I L
1 RADIDOSE Version 3.0 (5-18-2005)
2 Input Parameter User Input Default Description (based on user input)
2- FacilitylMaterial (1-14): I Plutonium Finishing Plant < 10% Pu-240
.4- FonnofMaterial (1-10): 7 Pu Oxide and Olher Powders5 Accident Type (1-6): 1 Fire
~ Quantity at Risk (MAR): I gram
..2.. Damage Ratio: I
...L Airborne Release Fraction: 6.00E-03 ARF from SARAH Table 3-4 (ARF page)
-2- Respirable Fraction: 0.1 RF from SARAH Table 3-4 (ARF page)
...!.Q. Leak Path Factor: 1 LPF (applies to particulate only)
II HEPA Filter Factor: 1 OF = I (applies to particulate only)
-4 Collocated Worker Dose Factor: 3 ICRP 68, 5 ~m AMAD~ ORsite & Offsite Public Dose Factor: 7 ICRP 72 for Adult14 Material Solubility Class: 3 compounds are £enerally insoluble
~ Hanford Processing Area (1-4): 4 400 Area~ Distance or XlQ for Collocated Worker: 100 meters
.g Distance or XlQ for Onsite Public: 4.210 meters
18 Distance or XlQ for Offsite Public: 7240 meters
.g, Emission Source Type (1-4): 4 Ground level fire
~ Thermal Power (2 to 1000 MW): 4 MW (at 0.05 W/ffil)
-# Pool Fire Diameter (l to 20 m): 10 meters (Area = 78.5 m2)22
23 IDescription of Accident Scenario: Edit using function key F2. Carriage returns are not allowed.
~~~ Ortiste XlQ based on distance from FFfF to the Site Boundary which is 4.5 miles.~i#29
30 Dose Results for the Postulated Accident: I
31 Plutonium Finishin2 Plant: < 10% Pu-240 -- New composition (2004) Material source amounts are
32 Pu Oxide and Other Powders listed on the "UnitDF" palZe.
33 Ground Level Fire -- 4 MW-- 10.0 m Diameter 400 Area
34 Total Resnirable Release: 6.00E-04 .cam
35 Dose Factors: ICRP68. Sum ICRP 72 for Adult Release
36 Collocated Onsite Offsite Duration
37 Recentor: Worker Public Public I h
38 Distance: 100m 4.210 m 7,240m
39 XlQ: 2,80&04 1.22E-05 8,67E-06 s/m3
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REVIEW CHECKUST
coeument RevieweCf: 1b"~·CQ"'#,~ arJ <;;+rucAJLm.i Cm<;~11.1e;-,cu ~
SM.--.m -~ ~ac.-n·fm." GJi c...;,.f.un.i~/4
~£nJ.- b:.A;l1I>') ra.nJ::-
~'SJ ~HvUn &-c.d~ WM--'
cl·,W r c,,(f'C.. ;II:> aG~~ .
Results and conclusions address all points required in the ptobIem It8tement
FOmlat conllatent with Ippraprlate NRC RegUlatory Guide or other standards.
• Review calCUlations. comll'fll'ta. andlcr notes are attached.
• Previous reviews complete and cover analysis. up to scope of this review. with no gaps.
Problem completely defined.
Acciclent acenanos developed in a a-and logical mam....
NeCOlssary assumptions explicitly slated and supported.
CompUter codes and data Illes documented.
Data U&ed in calcuJatiOl1ll explicitly staled in document
DalAI GhllGktld for consistency with original sou"", lriormetlon as applICable.
Malllemalical derivation checked including dimensional c:onaistency of .....ults.
Models appropriate and used within range of vaHdity or use outside range of established
validity lu,~fIed.
Hand ctlcuillion' chlckld for errors. SlQadah'lll1lsultl ,hould be treated el/tletly the
SlIIIIe II hind C8ICUlatlons.
Softwllre Input eorreel and conalalenl vAth document reviewed.
Softwal1l output consistent with Input Ind WItIl reau"s reported In document I1Ivtewed.
Urnit8lcriteriaiguideHnes appr,ed to analysis I1IIlUIts 8111 oppnlflriate and referenced.
Umitslcriteriaiguldelin.. cIItcked against refetences.
Saf8ty margins consistent with good engl.......ng pradlce..
Condu"ona eonaJst.ent wtttllll1B1yt1ca1 results end BppUcBbJe Ilmils.
D~approved•
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Reviewer (Printe<l Name and SlgnelUre)
'Any calculations, commenls. or nates generated a, palt of thlll1lvlew should be signed. dated and _""ed to this
checklist Su"" material should be labeled and recorded in IUch a manner as to be intelligible to a technically qualified third
party,
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